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Abstract 
This article considers the progress of the new system of police governance in 
England and Wales. It assesses the responsibilities and powers of Police and 
Crime Commissioners and also examines local initiatives undertaken by 
some PCCs which have proved to have national ramifications. It evaluates 
the accountability of PCCs between elections and highlights the limited 
powers of Police and Crime Panels. It considers the convention of police 
operational independence,  in the light of two controversial police 
investigations, and the potential need for PCC oversight of future publically 
high profile investigations. It provides an initial assessment of an important 
and recent Appeal Court ruling [R –v- South Yorkshire PCC, QBD 2017] 
which by making the PCC responsible for all police operational activity 
questions the tradition of constabulary operational independence. It is argued 
that enabling the PCC to bring a chief officer to account for all police 
operations could mean that potentially challenging and fruitless investigations 
can in the future, be avoided. 
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Introduction 
In what might be seen as one of the most significant indicators of central government 
commitment to localism the expansion of the role of Police and Crime Commissioners 
[PCCs] continues to develop. Latterly this has taken the form of extending PCC 
responsibility from the police to include local fire and rescue services. The continuing 
interest in the local delivery of services exhibited by government has also been reflected 
in the introduction in 2017 of directly elected Metro Mayors to six cities and combined 
authorities in England and Wales each of which will be immediately responsible for 
spending on health, transport and other strategic services in their respective areas. 
These developments represent, in terms of policing, a remarkable contrast to the earlier 
centralised model of governance within which national priorities assumed precedence 
and which were enforced by central intervention, national targets and an intrusive police 
inspectorate. In finally rejecting all of this and re-establishing local responsibility for 
police services the 2011 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act has provided a 
launching pad for greater innovation and local dynamism in a world no longer subject to 
a plethora of national performance targets. But problems remain to the extent that four 
years in to their life PCCs are still yet to fully engage with the public. While this situation 
is changing there is further to go in embedding the principle of local direct election within 
the political culture. 
The need for police governance reform 
The initial response to the introduction of PCCs was to be met- as demonstrated in the 
first elections of 2012- by a high degree of public indifference complicated by the failure 
of the Home Office to provide any information about the candidates to the electorate. 
The ‘omni-shambles’ which characterised the first PCC election was to be compounded 
by its stand- alone nature as it was not synchronised with local government elections. 
Not surprisingly therefore turn-out proved to be even lower than that previously achieved 
in the EU elections of 2014. 
Yet the evidence suggested that the need for a more effective mechanism at local level 
to improve police governance was certainly required. Police authorities in effect 
undermined by previous [Conservative] governments were no longer in a position to 
challenge or guide the chief officer. This was to be evidenced in a number of ways but 
was to be clearly demonstrated in the inaction of the police authority in South Yorkshire 
despite evidence of police malpractice during the Miner’s Strike 1985 and later at the 
Hillsborough football Stadium in Sheffield.    
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In fairness successive pieces of legislation but particularly the Police and Magistrates 
Court Act [1994] severely curtailed the role of the police authority while in the name of 
protecting the police from political interference significantly  enhanced the status and 
authority of the chief officer. One consequence of this proved to be the high degree of 
protection afforded chief constables who became impervious to any effective oversight at 
local level. In seeking to preserve the operational independence of the chief officer 
democratic accountability became a primary casualty –although, ironically, as the 
Thatcher government was to demonstrate a similar concern never arose in response to 
central intervention and national  police coordination [Loveday 1986].   
The steady erosion of local accountability of the police and the role of local municipal 
government was to be recorded elsewhere [ Marshall 1964; Marshall and Loveday 
1994]. The degree of autonomy exercised by chief officers was also to be, in the event of 
any challenge, reinforced by successive Home Secretaries who inevitably rejected them.  
In doing so the attitude adopted within the Home Office was to make the case for the 
implementation of major reform a matter of time rather than either political or 
professional judgement. Ironically it proved to be the Conservative party, previously a 
staunch defender of the police service, which was to initiate a reform programme that 
reversed all of the earlier protections afforded to the police and ended the close 
relationship between police and central government fostered during the 1980s and early 
1990s. Interestingly it proved to be Theresa May as Home Secretary from 2010 to 2017 
who was the primary driver of this reform programme.  
Powers of PCCs 
Under the 2011 Police Reform Act PCCs have been given substantial powers. Along 
with being responsible for both hiring and firing the chief constable all PCCs have 
responsibility for developing the local crime and policing plan. Additionally a general 
power of competence enables PCCs to do anything that is lawful [Loveday et al 2014]. 
The primary aim of the legislation was to fundamentally change the relationship between 
chief constable and the civilian authority. In support of this the Home Office was to 
encourage the creation of a principal –agent relationship where the PCC as principal 
held his agent, the chief constable, to account. This entirely reversed the arrangements 
that pertained with the earlier police authorities where in reality there had been a 
significant role reversal with the chief officer acting as the principal and the police 
authority as that officer’s agent.  The perceived change in relationship heralded by the 
2011 Police Reform Act may have in part explained the sudden departure of many 
senior officers prior to its implementation. Furthermore the legislation was to mark the 
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end of the traditional role of the Home Office as national protector of chief officers. The 
end of national target setting by the Home Office has been matched by the decision not 
to intervene in local disputes between PCC and chief constable where this might arise. 
One consequence of this has been a remarkable increase in the turnover of chief 
constables who have found themselves in dispute with their PCC. The changing 
relationship was in fact to encourage the Home Affairs Committee to investigate the work 
of PCCs in 2014 and their progress to that date [HAC 2013-14, Sixteenth Report]. This 
followed on from what appeared to be a sudden departure from past practice as chief 
officers from a number of forces were refused new contracts, invited to retire or took 
early retirement. 
 In Avon and Somerset the chief officer was, after applying for a renewal of his contract, 
invited to ‘re-apply’  for his job. In HR terms this was tantamount to dismissal – a 
decision made by the PCC which was to be later upheld by the High Court. In Gwent the 
confrontation between the chief constable and PCC led the latter to question her 
professional competence which effectively resulted in her departure from the force. In 
oral evidence given later to the Home Affairs Committee the former chief officer was to 
make reference to what to her appeared to be the ‘unfettered powers of the PCC’ 
[Loveday et al 2014].      
The interesting change in employment status held by chief officers does not appear to 
have presented a problem to PCCs either. In evidence to the Home Affairs Committee 
the PCC for Sussex, in responding to concern about chief officer turnover, was to 
comment that there had been considerable ‘churn’ at the top as many chief constables 
had left for a variety of reasons. She concluded however  that this was not ‘an unhealthy 
thing in any organisation’ as it ‘gave others opportunities to come forward’[Brunetti 
2014]. This suggested that the traditional commitment to protect the chief constable had 
entirely evaporated and decisions made locally were not likely to be challenged by the 
centre.  
 It was also noticeable that the role held in the past by CHMIC has also fundamentally 
changed too. Traditionally responsible for the determination of chief constable 
appointments by way of drawing up short lists for all police authorities HMIC now has an 
advisory role although a recent judgement by the High Court suggests this function will 
take on greater significance in the future [R-v-PCC South Yorkshire QBD 2017]. Chief 
officer appointments are the responsibility of the PCC who is now only required to seek 
the support of the Police and Crime Panel in the final determination of the officer 
selected. The issue of chief officer selection has most recently been further highlighted 
by the current Home Secretary who has stated that directly appointed chief constables 
5 
 
from outside of the police service would now be encouraged by the Home Office 
[Hamilton 2017]. 
Accountability of PCCs 
Given the wide ranging powers now at the disposal of PCCs the immediate concern is 
the extent to which they are held accountable to the public they serve. This issue was to 
assume some prominence in terms of the selection and payment by many PCCs of 
deputies and assistant PCCs. Their selection by many PCCs was to see a significant 
increase in the back office staff of the Office of PCC [OPCC] in many forces. Selection 
criteria in a number of cases proved to be quite vague and media coverage of 
appointments was to raise claims of ‘cronyism’ and bias in selection based on personal 
professional or party political relationships [Ludwig et al 2017]. 
The problem of accountability of PCCs has been compounded by the very instrument of 
direct election which was identified as a means of strengthening their position vis a vis 
the chief constable. Elected every four years it became apparent early on that this 
election process offered little direct accountability between elections at the precise time 
that PCCs might be heavily engaged in official appointments, determining crime 
strategies and liaising with the chief officer on at least a weekly basis.  
The problem of ‘transparency’ of the PCC was to be identified as a potential matter of 
concern by the Home Affairs Committee in 2014. It argued that there was a need for 
PCCs to highlight who they were, what they did, what they spent and how they spent it, 
along with what policies and procedures governed the operation of the OPCC. As the 
HAC Report noted many concerns remained unresolved and that little information was 
provided about their work by either the Home Office or the Association of PCCs [HAC 
2014:para 28].  
A further Report from the Committee on Standards in Public Life into the work of PCCs 
was to draw attention to what it described as ‘evidence of significant standards risks 
including continuing confusion over roles and responsibilities, insufficient challenge and 
scrutiny of PCC decisions and insufficient redress where a PCC falls below the 
standards of behaviour expected of a holder of public office’ [Committee on Standards 
Report 2015]. 
This problem has been compounded by the fact that as an elective office anyone can 
stand for election and there is no quality control over candidates and neither is there any 
skills training on offer to those who might win an election. This may explain the variable 
nature and quality of PCCs many of whom proved to be ‘Independents’ in the first PCC 
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election of 2013. This was to be demonstrated most vividly in the case of the first Labour 
PCC for South Yorkshire. Here the PCC refused to resign his position in face of public 
hostility arising from his earlier involvement in council decision making. This surrounded 
the grooming by members of the ethnic community of young females in Rotherham over 
a number of years. The lack of accountability between elections has also been 
compounded by the less than adequate mechanism designed to engage the local 
community – the Police and Crime Panel. 
Police and Crime Panels [PCPs] 
Outside of London every PCC area has a local PCP which now provides the sole 
mechanism to bring the PPC to account between elections. Designed as a means of 
interrogating PCC decisions in the police force area PCPs were very much an after -
thought pushed by the Lib Dem Coalition members on to a reluctant Conservative 
Policing Minister. In determining that the Panel structure would not be in danger of 
recreating police authorities in the police force PCPs were to be given very limited 
powers and few resources. 
Recent research has shown that Ministerial decisions here have meant that PCPs other 
than their deep structural weaknesses demonstrate many characteristics of the old 
police authorities. It means they are ineffective and very largely unable to undertake the 
statutory role set for them within the 2011 Police Reform Act [Bailey 2016; 2017; Lister 
2014].   
As the only formal mechanism available to challenge or question the PCC over policy it 
might be thought important that the work of the PCP is supported if only because they 
can channel local public concern to the PCC between elections. For a variety of reasons 
any expectations relating to PCPs have not and are unlikely to be ever fulfilled. The high 
turnover of membership, partly due to local political appointees, lack of resources and 
limited opportunities to engage with the PCC mean that for most PCCs [and chief 
constables] local police and crime panels remain an irrelevance [Bailey 2017; Watts 
2015].  
This might suggest that to some degree the Police Reform Act may have only served to 
solve one problem by replacing it with another. If before the Act the position of the chief 
constable was viewed in terms of accountability as being highly problematic this issue 
has now been replicated in terms of the power position enjoyed by the PCC in relation to 
PCPs between elections.  
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Developing local Police and Crime Plans 
One of the most significant responsibilities which fall to the PCC is that of responding to 
crime in the force area. In general this responsibility has enabled the PCC to engage 
with a range of local statutory and voluntary bodies in the force area. In most cases this 
has involved establishing effective links with local community safety partnerships [CSPs] 
established under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and later legislation. Being 
responsible for crime and not just policing has served to substantially widen the PCC 
remit and to extend the PCC role, unlike that of the police authority well beyond a narrow 
oversight of the police force.  
Initially the Labour party was to challenge the value of PCCs  and by way of the Steven’s 
Enquiry. This was to present a competing model of police governance based on the 
creation of regional police forces and regional police boards made responsible for their 
oversight. This proposal was in the end to be abandoned as many Labour PCCs were to 
argue that experience of both police authorities and PCCs indicated that the latter were 
much more effective in driving policy and executive decision making. In a joint 
publication by Labour PCCs a range of initiatives were to be identified designed to 
increase police effectiveness. These emanated from OPCCs and which, they claimed, 
were never likely to have seen light of day within the old police authority world [Fabian 
Policy Report 2014].    
Identifying the significant role given to PCCs in terms of strategic policy formulation one 
PCC was, within the same report, to outline a method of developing local police and 
crime plans. As was argued: 
‘We are required to consult our communities to ascertain what they want from the police 
and crime plans. These are designed to give a strategic direction to our chief constables 
and we join the public to scrutinise and evaluate how the plan is being delivered. Our 
control of the local policing budget ensures what the public wants  does happen and 
represents a significant shift of power towards the public’ [Fabian Policy Report :2014].  
One function of local police and crime plans can be seen as an additional means of 
encouraging public participation. This has been supported by innovative use of social 
media and on-line interaction with the chief officer and PCC on a regular basis [HAC 
Report 2014]. Elsewhere the PCC has in one force area established an independent 
panel of residents which reviews complaints files against the police force and publishes 
reports[ HAC 2014:para 61]. In another the PCC has created independent custody 
visitors who report directly to the PCC on the services delivered by the chief constable 
and the force [HAC 2014: para 61]. 
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Yet these examples are more than matched by local policing initiatives which 
subsequently proved to have national ramifications. In Northumbria the evident failure of 
the police and other agencies to protect young women in the Night Time Economy [NTE] 
led to a PCC initiative identified as the ’safeguarding programme’ for young women 
made vulnerable within the NTE. The programme has now become a compulsory 
element of the Security Industry Authority’s new entrant course for all door staff [Baird 
2016]. 
In Nottinghamshire the PCC was to commission a report to ‘collect personal experiences 
of policing within the BME community’ which constitutes a substantial component of 
urban Nottingham. As the PCC noted however:  
‘The report made for uncomfortable reading and was the launch pad for improvements 
not only increasing transparency of the police use of stop and search  but also 
toughening procedures to ensure every use of these powers was fair , balanced and 
justified’ [Tipping 2016]. 
One quite dramatic consequence of the PCC report and implementation of change in the 
local use of stop and search powers by the police has been that Nottinghamshire Police 
has one of the lowest uses of these powers in the country but now also experiences one 
of the highest arrest and positive outcome rates. As is argued: 
‘In 2015-16 the total number of stop and search encounters fell by almost 40% 
compared to the previous 12 months, while 379 arrests were made as a results of these 
powers which included 50 arrests for possessing weapons’[Tipping 2016].    
The same PCC concluded that scrutiny undertaken by the OPCC had proved to be a key 
to improvement and where within the police force officers were performance managed to 
ensure all stops and searches were accurately and lawfully recorded [Tipping 2016]. 
Elsewhere the use of activity analysis and evidence based research by the OPCC has 
also proved to have national implications. In Staffordshire a visit made by the PCC to 
operational police officers indicated that much police time was being taken up by non-
criminal incidents. While this feature of police activity is not unusual, the nature of 
demand had not been fully appreciated. A subsequent review commissioned by the 
OPCC in 2013 was established to learn how much time officers spent responding to 
mental health issues in the community. 
The review was to reveal that in the previous year police had responded to 15,000 
incidents in Staffordshire involving people with mental health issues  and that on average 
at least 20% of their time was taken up with such cases [Staffordshire OPCC Mental 
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Health Review: 2013] . The Ethics, Transparency and Audit Panel set up by the same 
OPCC was later requested to report on how a seriously ill man spent 64 hours in police 
custody despite not committing a crime, because suitable NHS services were not 
available.  
The subsequent report found that the incident was to involve 22 police officers over a 
long weekend and that despite the best efforts of the police the ‘man’s condition 
deteriorated while in custody’. The report concluded that police officers were left to deal 
with mental health cases ‘on a scale which was outside of their expertise’ [OPCC Staffs 
2016]. The evidence from Staffordshire proved to be highly influential and has 
subsequently helped drive national policy in this complex and highly challenging area. 
As these examples suggest the PCC experience has to date proved to be innovative and 
for the first time has provided a new platform for positive intervention to improve police 
effectiveness. This feature of the new governance has in fact been recognised by the 
Home Affairs Committee which in a recent report was to comment that: 
‘One clear message from our evidence is that PCCs have provided greater clarity of 
leadership for policing within their areas and are increasingly recognised by the public as 
accountable for the strategic direction of their police force’ [HAC 2014: para 56].   
Operational Independence 
Given the wide powers accredited to the PCC and the role provided in developing the 
local police and crime plan there must be some potential danger that the PCC, in fulfilling 
these responsibilities, could stray into areas defined as police ‘operational’ matters. This 
traditionally has been seen as a major element in protecting the police from any political 
interference. This matter has however  been complicated over time as the police service 
has used ever wider definitions of what constitutes ‘operational’ and which as a result  
precluded any independent assessment or effective oversight. 
This feature of non-intervention was to encourage a greater degree of local police 
autonomy. It may also have encouraged a potential [and real] danger of encouraging 
professional concealment where the ever wider discretion accorded chief officers could 
support clandestine behaviour among operational officers on the ground as in South 
Yorkshire. In the world of the police authority it was always unlikely that elected officials 
would seek to challenge this convention and if they did then they would be quickly 
rebuffed by chief officers [Brogden: 1982; Reiner: 2000:189].  
Indeed the tragedy which surrounded the Hillsborough Inquiry could be seen in 
retrospect as a logical outcome to this overly defensive protection of constabulary 
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independence. Here after many years of confusion and contradictory claims as to the 
nature of events at the Hillsborough football stadium an independent enquiry was to 
discover a major police exercise in misinformation and disinformation which was to be 
initiated and over seen by the chief constable. In requiring all officers who attended the 
stadium that day to rewrite their notebooks to ensure that any failures or mistakes by 
South Yorkshire Police were exorcised, the chief constable ensured that blame for the 
disaster identified by the popular press would continue fall, not on his officers, but on 
Liverpool football supporters [Loveday : 2012]. Twenty six years later the reverberations 
of this decision continued to be evidenced in the dismissal by the PCC in 2016, of the 
then chief constable. There is, unsurprisingly, no evidence that the police authority either 
at the time or later, sought to challenge the chief constable on this matter. 
The Hillsborough tragedy and subsequent enquiry may however serve to provide a 
platform upon which to re-address the issue of police operational independence. As a 
convention the whole doctrine of police independence has a questionable pedigree in 
law and was to be forensically analysed by Marshall  who challenged both the basic 
assumptions surrounding the doctrine and also its legal status [Marshall 1965; Marshall 
and Loveday1994]. 
Thus while the Policing Protocol Order 2011 states that PCCs ‘must not fetter the 
operational independence of the police force and the chief constable that leads it’ recent 
developments suggest that a more pro-active stance, if adopted by the PCC, would be of 
some value. It might also prove to be of greater benefit than the current retrospective 
accountability powers exercised by the PCC particularly where operational decisions 
made by chief officers have proved to be either potentially misguided or evident failures. 
Some interesting examples of these have been highlighted in recent years. 
Operation Midland MPS 
In the MPS the former Commissioner, Sir Bernard Hogan- Howe, was to help initiate and 
thereafter support Operation Midland an investigation into the claims of one assumed 
victim of sexual offences committed by a number of high profile politicians along with the 
former chief of general staff Lord Bramall. Deeming the evidence of one self –proclaimed 
victim as ‘credible’ senior officers were to pursue the Midland enquiry through to its 
‘ignominious and expensive collapse’ [The Times 2017]. 
Later the ‘victim’ was to be revealed as a known fantasist who may also have been 
encouraged in making claims of sexual abuse by the use of psychotherapy. The 
Commissioner, despite this, proved adamant in refusing to apologise to those who 
ended up being the real victims of the investigation. In what might be viewed as a highly 
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critical assessment of his period as Commissioner, an editorial in The Times was later to 
conclude that: 
‘He had defended the indefensible until such defence was no longer tenable, withheld 
apologies from those owed them until such withholding became scandalous and then 
apologised grudgingly. He has spoken the language of transparency while practicing 
opacity .He has encouraged among his officers something of a return to secrecy and 
unaccountable arrogance. His PR has been self- serving and has indicated a departure 
from the purest ideas of public service’ [The Times February 2017].    
Here, it might be thought, was evident grounds for intervention by the London Mayor, the 
elected authority  to whom the Commissioner was ostensibly accountable. There is little 
evidence of any attempt to interrogate the Commissioner’s actions by the then Mayor 
Boris Johnson even though there was clearly sufficient grounds for much greater 
‘intrusive oversight’. Ultimately it proved to be the incoming mayor Sadiq Kahn who 
exercised his powers in deciding to refuse to extend the Commissioners contract. 
Operation Conifer Wiltshire 
Nor has the MPS proved to be the only example of what in retrospect can be only 
viewed as questionable grounds for a major investigation and which also raised 
concerns as to the professional competence of chief officers involved. In Wiltshire 
Operation Conifer has demonstrated once again a readiness on the part of the police to 
initiate an investigation based on the questionable allegations of victims of historic sex 
abuse.  The Conifer investigation has been directed against the former Prime Minister 
Sir Edward Heath. Interestingly the senior officer in charge was to initiate the 
investigation outside of the former home of the chief suspect. This was to receive, not 
perhaps surprisingly, considerable media coverage and raised some doubt as to the 
impartiality of the police investigation itself. 
Despite the conclusions of an independent adviser that in this case as in others, the 
police should immediately close down any investigations based on the ‘pernicious 
fallacy’ of claims of ritual abuse particularly where witnesses had been enabled by a 
psychotherapist  ‘to recall their past’ [Booth 2016] the police inquiry was to  continue. 
Later in a Parliamentary Debate on Operation Conifer Lord Armstrong was to state that: 
‘Having served in the Home Office for four years I understand about the operational 
independence of the police but this matter has gone beyond operational matters; it has 
become a matter of confidence in the police and the police duty of investigating 
allegations and following up evidence and has pronounced a verdict of guilty on the late 
12 
 
Sir Edward Heath in respect of child abuse even before the chief constable’s enquiry is 
complete’ [Hansard Online 2017 Vol 779]. 
In responding to a question raised in the same debate as to whom the chief constable of 
Wiltshire was accountable the Minister of State for the Home Office was to state that it 
was for the PCC to make the decision to appoint suspend or to remove a chief constable 
but that the PCC might compel a chief constable to resign or retire under Section 38[3] of 
the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011.  
This might suggest that the PCC may intervene if in the opinion of the Commissioner, 
there appears to be sufficient grounds to do so. However in exercising this power the 
PCC must do so reasonably, fairly and after consulting both the chief constable and the 
local police and crime panel. Under the Police Reform Act much will now, therefore, 
depend on the evidence, perception and attitude of the PCC. There was to be no 
intervention by the Wiltshire PCC and Operation Conifer was to be completed in October 
2017 with the publication of a ‘Summary Closure Report’ by Wiltshire Police [Summary 
Closure Report Wiltshire Police 2017].  
Doubts as to the objectivity of the investigation were however to arise in response to a 
statement which appeared to originate from Wiltshire police officers who, it was stated,  
believed ‘120%’ in the allegations of paedophilia made against the former prime minister 
[Walters 2017]. Other than apparently pre-judging any conclusions arrived at by the very 
investigation for which they were responsible the officers appeared not to have fully 
appreciated the findings of an independent advisers brought in to review the inquiry. 
These had concluded that there was not a shred of evidence against the former Tory 
leader and that the claims made against him, including allegations of ritualistic murder,  
were ‘clearly absurd’ [[Telegraph 2017]. 
Indeed there was a growing suspicion that the central allegation of ritual abuse appeared 
to have in fact originated in a publication entitled ‘The Greatest Secret’ written some 
years before in which claims were reportedly made by an unnamed middle aged female 
source about both Edward Heath and his Chancellor of the Exchequer. In this both were 
claimed to be, in the early 1970s, involved in ritualistic abuse [Icke 1999:300]. 
Involving a team of seven officers, eleven police staff and headed by a chief 
superintendent the Conifer inquiry has, since it was established in 2015 been estimated 
to have cost around £1.5 million [Mendrick and Evans 2017]. The chief constable who 
defended the inquiry by reference to his operational independence was in the course of 
the investigation to state that a significant number of individuals  had alleged abuse but 
refused to say how many or provide details of the only two people to be arrested [and 
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subsequently released  from police custody].In October a Report on Operation Conifer 
was to be made public which detailed a number of alleged offences ‘where if still alive, 
Sir Edward Heath would have been interviewed under caution’. Of these the most 
significant alleged offence proved to be ‘rape of a male under the age of 16, contrary to 
Section1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956’. [Summary Closure Report, 2017:9.15]. 
Subsequently it was to be discovered that this, the most serious allegation, [ Summary 
Closure Report  2017:9.15]  had been brought by a jailed paedophile offender serving a 
lengthy sentence for child abuse. It was also learned that his claim of rape in fact been 
investigated much earlier and dropped by the Metropolitan Police in 2015 [Mendick and 
Evans 2017]. Siblings of the alleged victim were to state, later, that they had no 
recollection of their brother being abducted and then raped by Sir Edward Heath as he 
subsequently claimed. Wiltshire Police had however failed to interview any of the 
relations about the rape allegation [Mendrick 2017]. 
PCC powers of intervention 
The examples of police investigations identified above might suggest that on occasion it 
would be appropriate for the PCC to intervene. Yet one problem remains. There appears 
to be no action other than that of suspension or dismissal that a PCC can currently 
exercise when confronted with ‘operational policing’ that, as in the examples examined 
earlier appear to go beyond the rational and to enter the realm of the absurd.  In the light 
of recent experience of police operational independence there must be some concern 
that in protecting the police from one form of potential abuse this may only serve to 
foster another.  
Recently the Home Affairs Committee has argued forcibly for PCCs to guard against the 
inherent risks of the new governance model by avoiding any temptation to interfere in the 
operational independence of chief constables [HAC 2014:para67]. It has also expressed 
concern about the lack of clarity surrounding any decision made by the PCC to call upon 
a chief constable to resign or retire. 
Following the South Yorkshire PCC’s recent decision to exercise that power in relation to 
his own chief constable this has recently been tested in the High Court. This followed on 
from an appeal made by the former chief constable contesting the decision of the PCC to 
dismiss him in April 2016. In the event the Court was to find in favour of the appellant 
and against the PCC for South Yorkshire. In doing so it clearly sought to narrow the 
ground upon which a PCC could initiate a dismissal procedure under section 38 of the 
Police reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 [Muir 2017]. 
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Concluding that the PCC had acted ‘irrationally’ in regard to his decision to suspend the 
chief constable  the court  found that the PCC had also paid insufficient regard to the 
views expressed about the case by HMCIC [QBD para 145:2017. The PCC had, the 
court stated, failed to engage with the substance of much of the HMCIC’s observations 
and ‘failed to provide cogent reasons for taking a different view’ [R-v-PCC South 
Yorkshire QBD para 159:160 2017]. This was to lead the Court to declare the decision 
by the PCC to proceed with the dismissal as also being ‘irrational’ on the part of the 
PCC..  
Limiting the discretion exercised by the PCC in relation to suspension or dismissal 
procedures under Section 38 of the Act would appear to be the primary outcome of this 
case and there is no suggestion of reinstating the chief constable. However the same 
judgement was to highlight the fact that the PCC  was not just entitled but ‘obliged to 
hold the relevant chief constable to account  in respect of all the functions  of the chief 
constable and for all the functions of those acting under his direction and control’ [R-v- 
PCC South Yorkshire QBD Para 76:2017].  
As has been noted most recently by Muir, the tension which exists between the 
conflicting principles of operational independence and democratic oversight and 
accountability continues to pertain [Muir 2017]. Yet the judgement of the court has in fact 
also served to significantly clarify the position of the PCC in relation to police operations. 
As the court has declared, while the Policing Protocol recognises the operational 
independence of the Chief Constable the Act clearly undermines both the status and 
meaning of the Protocol. As has been found by the court: 
‘The PCC is obliged to hold the chief constable to account for every function he 
performs. In our judgement matters relevant to operational independence are not 
excluded from the scope of the PCCs power of scrutiny. The operational independence 
at common law [See notably  Commissioner of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn [1968 
2QB 118 at 135] must give way if so required by the terms of the 2011 Act and in our 
judgement the Act qualifies that common law rule’ [ R-v- PCC S Yorkshire QBD 
Para78:2017]. 
The judgement also states that the Policing Protocol provides a more ‘nuanced 
approach’ than the common law, to both the importance of operational independence 
and the competing imperative of democratic oversight of the police. It concludes 
however that: 
‘It is in our judgement impossible to see operational independence as being beyond the 
supervision of the PCC’ [R –v- PCC South Yorkshire QBD Para 79:2017].    
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The judgement might be construed as a significant challenge to the doctrine of police 
independence from both central and local control espoused by the police service. This 
found legal expression originally within the Fisher –V- Oldham Corporation case of 1930 
where it was found that the police should perform their duties as constables wholly 
independently of the watch committee and upon which the Blackburn dicta was to later 
based [Marshall and Loveday 296:298:1994]. This judgement can be expected to be 
subject to yet further scrutiny by the Courts. It does however provide the first significant 
breach in the traditional police defence of their operational independence.  
Conclusion 
The powers exercised by PCCs in relation to the chief constable may now be the subject 
of further scrutiny by the Courts. It remains the case that the Police Reform and Social 
Responsibility Act 2011 has provided a dramatic departure from the tripartite model 
established by the 1964 Police Act. The commitment to local service delivery has been 
made manifest in providing a new framework for police governance which begins to 
rebalance the relationship between police and local government.  
The reality of police autonomy experienced in the past has been basically challenged by 
a Conservative government that remains committed to new localism and to ending 
central direction and oversight of the police service. In doing so it presents a remarkable 
contrast to the direction taken in Scotland where a national police system, Police 
Scotland, was to be introduced in 2013 [ Fyfe N and Scott K B 2013].The many problems 
that have attended this development suggest that a local rather than national police 
service is likely to be more responsive and accountable to local communities particularly 
where coterminous boundaries are established between local authorities and police 
forces [Loveday 2015].  
There are however many issues which need to be addressed within the PCC model. Of 
these the most significant is the limited oversight currently exercised by local police and 
crime panels [PCPs]. Recent research has demonstrated the severe limitations placed 
on PCPs and means that much of the business conducted by the OPCC is not subject to 
effective review. This would include all appointments made by the PCC to the OPCC and 
much of the decision making which takes place within that office [Bailey 2017]. 
It is also evident that candidates for the office of PCC can be of a variable quality. 
Additionally the criteria adopted for internal appointments may leave much to be desired 
[Loveday Lewis et al 2015; Ludwig et al 2017] . In its 2015 Report the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life was to draw attention to there being insufficient challenge and 
scrutiny of PCCs decisions and that these were ‘insufficient redress where a PCC fell 
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below the standards of behaviour that the public expects of a holder of public office’ 
[Committee on Standards Report 2015:5].  Not surprisingly the Committee on Standards 
was to highlight the weaknesses of Police and Crime Panels which now represent both 
the sole means of bringing PCCs to account between elections and encouraging greater 
transparency of PCCs decision making [Committee on Standards Report 2017:Para 
3.92].     
Further concerns relate to the selection and appointment of chief constables. It is 
becoming increasingly apparent that selection is now largely in house at chief constable 
level and based on internal promotion rather than outside appointment [ Watts 2018 
forthcoming]. Nor is it clear as to what criteria may be applied in relation to their 
selection. This now remains the exclusive responsibility of the PCC and the OPCC. This 
too raises questions about selection criteria adopted by the PCC for Deputy PCC 
appointments. As a recent case involving the selection of a deputy PCC for 
Cambridgeshire and Peterborough has demonstrated ‘due diligence’ supposedly 
undertaken by the OPCC may not always precede selection [Evans 2017]. 
These issues, while significant, are not beyond rectification. It would be entirely 
appropriate for parliament to revisit the role of local police and crime panels with a view 
to enhancing their powers and providing them with sufficient resources to enable the 
PCP to undertake an effective scrutiny of the PCC. It may also be of value to encourage 
HMCI to engage with local PCCs in decisions surrounding the future selection of the 
Chief Constable. 
This might be of value particularly at a time when the current Home Secretary is openly 
canvassing for civilian personnel to compete with senior police officers for each of the 43 
chief constable positions in England and Wales [Hamilton 2017].  The re-introduction of 
a local model of policing in England and Wales has many advantages but also generates 
potential risk. This might be best managed by a continued commitment to openness and 
transparency within police governance along with effective checks and balances. This 
has been succinctly argued most recently by the Committee on Standards in Public Life 
in its recent report on leadership, ethics and accountability in policing. There is much to 
suggest that this will be of immediate value to the new police governance structure and 
process in England and Wales.  
 
                                                         END 
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